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Galvan: Creditors' Rights - Who Is a Contractor under the Mechanics' Lien
CREDITORS' RIGHTS-Who Is a Contractor Under the Mechanics' Lien Law.
American Buildings v. Wheelers Stores, 585 P.2d. 845 (Wyo. 1978).

American Buildings Company manufactured prefabricated buildings for commercial and industrial use. In 1974,
representatives of Wheelers, a retail stores company, met
with American's regional sales representative to negotiate
the purchase of several buildings over a period of time. Since
American did not sell its buildings directly to customers, the
parties agreed that American would sell each building
ordered by Wheelers to one of its independent dealers, who
would, in turn, sell to Wheelers.' All purchase contracts were
to be exclusively between Wheelers and the independent
dealer in each transaction,' and Wheelers was instructed to
make all payments directly to the dealer.
Following this arrangement, Wheelers bought five
prefabricated buildings from American through its independent dealers. In the fifth transaction, Wheelers purchased a
building from Industrial Building Company, American's
Wyoming dealer.5 Although this building was a standard
design model, it was modified at Wheelers' request for a
specially designed roof system.' American delivered the
building components to the store site in Torrington, Wyoming. When these components arrived, they constituted an
essentially finished product, requiring only bolting together
and erection to complete the structure.7 Although other
American dealers had made separate contracts with
Wheelers to erect buildings in the past, neither American nor
Industrial supplied the labor for erecting this building. Instead, Wheelers hired labor from another source.'
Wheelers paid Industrial the full purchase price for the
building upon its completion.9 Industrial, however, defaulted
on its payments to the supplier, American Buildings Company, which then filed a materialman's lien against Wheelers" under the Wyoming mechanics' lien statutes."
Copyright ©1979 by the University of Wyoming.
1. American Buildings Company v. Wheelers Stores, 585 P.2d 845 (Wyo. 1978).
2. Brief for Appellant at 3, American Buildings Company v. Wheelers Stores, 584 P.2d
845 (Wyo. 1978).
3. Brief for Appellee at 3, American Buildings Company v. Wheelers Stores, 585 P.2d
845 (Wyo. 1978).
4. Id. at 4.
5. American Buildings Company v. Wheelers Stores, supra note 1, at 848.
6. Brief for Appellant at 4, American Buildings Company v. Wheelers Stores, 585 P.2d
845 (Wyo. 1978).
7. Id. at 4.
8. American Buildings Company v. Wheelers Stores, supra note 1, at 848, n. 6.
9. Id. at 846.
10. Id.
11. WYo. STAT. §§ 29-2-102 (1977).
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In denying American's foreclosure action, the trial
judge held that American did not come within the scope of
protection afforded construction creditors under Section
29-2-102 of the Wyoming Statutes," and also that American
was estopped from asserting a mechanics' lien."3 On appeal,
the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed, holding that as a materialman, Industrial Building Company was not a contractor of Wheelers for the purposes of Section 29-2-102, and
therefore American, as a materialman supplying another
materialman, was not entitled to assert a lien under the
statute. 4 Although the court might have affirmed on the
alternative theory that American was estopped from asserting a lien because Wheelers had relied on its instructions in
making payment directly to Industrial, 5 the court, having
resolved the first issue, did not consider that question in
reaching its decision.16
APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF MECHANICS' LIENS

Mechanics' liens have been created by statute to secure
priority of payment to particular classes of creditors in the
construction field whose material or labor has enhanced the
value of another person's real property.1 7 Mechanics' liens
were not recognized at common law or at equity, and
emerged in this country in response to the necessity of encouraging the growth of the construction industries during
the economic and geographic expansion of the Federalist
period.1 8 Today, every state has enacted some form of mechanics' lien law, although the different jurisdictions vary
widely in the provisions, interpretation, and application of
those laws.19 Therefore, determination of an individual claimant's rights is subject to the interpretation of local statutes.2 0 Although some jurisdictions construe mechanics' lien
12.
13.
14.
15.

WYO. STAT. § 29-2-102 (1977).
American Buildings Company v. Wheelers Stores, supra note 1, at 847.
Id. at 850.
The basis for the lower court's holding on the estoppel issue was not discussed in the
Wyoming Supreme Court opinion or in the briefs for the parties. However, the
general rule is that the right to a mechanics' lien may be waived or lost by conduct

on the part of the lien claimant which would render it inequitable for him to assert a

18.
19.

lien. F or a discussion of the issue of estoppel and waiver in mechanics' lien situations, see Annot., 65 A.L.R. 282, 317 (1930).
American Buildings Company v. Wheelers Stores, supra note 1, at 850.
United Pacific Insurance Co. v. Martin & Luther General Contractors, 455 P.2d 664,
675 (Wyo. 1969).
PHILLIPS, MECHANICS LIENS § 6 (1874).
53 AM. Jur. 2d Mechanics Liens § 5 (1970).

20.

Id. at § 7.

16.
17.
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statutes liberally, as remedial measures," others, like
Wyoming, interpret their statutes narrowly as being in derogation of the common law." Most jurisdictions, including
Wyoming, insist on strict compliance with statutory notice
and procedural requirements.2"
The Requirement of a Contract
In general, the right of materialmen or laborers to assert
mechanics' liens depends upon the existence of a contract
made with the property owner, his agent, or very commonly,
with a contractor retained by the owner to obtain the
materials or services from subcontractors.24 However, while
the contract is a prerequisite to the right to assert a
mechanics' lien, the right itself is not a contract right. The
contract does not create the mechanics' lien because, by
statute, the lien arises automatically from the use of the
materials or labor in improving real property. 5 The lien
creates a right against the owner's property, which has absorbed the value of the materials or labor, regardless of
whether the contract was made with the owner or with the
owner's contractor.
When the contract on which a mechanics' lien is based
has been made with a contractor rather than with the property owner, the right to assert the lien is either derivative or
direct, depending on the type of statute involved.2 6 Derivative liens depend on, and are limited by, the existence of a
debt owing to the contractor by the property owner. Once
the property owner has satisfied his debt to the contractor,
all mechanics' liens claims against his property are discharged."
21. E.g., Missouri: Western Sash & Door Co. v. Buckner, 80 Mo. App. 95, 99 (1899);
Arizona: Ranch House Supply Corporation v. Van Slyke, 91 Ariz. 177, 370 P.2d 661,
664 (1962). In Texas, constitutional provisions creating mechanics' liens are to be
liberally construed, although interpretation of statutory liens are restricted to
legislative intent. Crutcher, Rolfs, Cummings, Inc. v. Big Three Welding Equipment
Co. 224 S.W.2d 884, 888 (1949), reversed on other grounds 149 T. 204, 229 S.W.2d
600 (1950).
22. Cities Service Oil Company v. Pubco Petroleum Corp., 497 P.2d 1368, 1372 (Wyo.
1972).
23. Arch Sellery, Inc. v. Simpson, 346 P.2d 1068, 1071 (Wyo. 1959).
24. Western Sash & Door Co. v. Buckner, supra note 21, at 99.
25. 53 AM. JuR. supra note 19, § 49.
26. The Wyoming mechanics' lien statute creates a direct lien. Becker v. Hopper. 23
Wyo. 209, 138 P. 179, 180 (1914), affirmed on rehearing, 147 P. 1085 (1915).
27. Comment, The Missouri Mechanics'Lien Statute-Is It Adequate?, 26 Mo. L. REV.
53 (1961).
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Wyoming's mechanics' lien statutes fall into the direct
lien category. 2 Direct liens arise independent of any obliga-

tion of the owner to the general contractor. Justification for
allowing liens against real property by third persons who
have no direct contractual relationship with the property
owner is usually expressed in terms of an "agency" in the
general contractor, sometimes said to have been created by
statute, and sometimes implied in the owner-contractor relationship.29 However, this quasi-agency relationship applies
only for the purposes of mechanics' and materialmen's liens
and their foreclosure, and does not encompass the usual
agency relationship whereby contracts made by an agent
bind his principal and third parties." The contract between
the owner and the general contractor is deemed to have
authorized the contractor to make subcontracts on the
owner's behalf. Consequently, laborers and materialmen
entering into such subcontracts are presumed to have done
so in reliance on the owner's ability to pay and not on the
contractor's own credit." Whatever the source of the right,
under a direct lien statute, a laborer or materialman may
assert a lien directly against the property of the owner, even
though the owner may have already paid his contractor in
full. 32

Without the preferential treatment afforded by mechanics' lien statutes, materialmen and laborers would be
reduced to the status of mere general creditors of the property owner or contractor.3 " However, remedies available to
other kinds of creditors are usually not available to construction creditors. This is because the goods or services which
have been contributed to the improvement of real estate lose
their independent value when they are incorporated into the
property. Materialmen and laborers cannot withhold property pending payment for their materials or services, as they
neither possess nor control the property in question. Similarly, materials and labor cannot ordinarily be severed from real
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Becker v. Hopper, supra note 26.
26 Mo. L. REV. supra note 29, at 53.
Pierson v. Sewell. 539 P.2d 590, 595 (Idaho 1975).
53 AM. JUR. 2d Mechanics Liens § 101 (1970).
26 Mo. L. REV. supra note 27.
Id
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property without risk of waste, which effectively prevents
repossession if payment fails. 3 '
Laborers and materialmen frequently find that judgment against undercapitalized general contractors fail
because there are few unencumbered assets with which to
pay those judgments." They cannot initiate garnishment
proceedings against the property owner if the owner has
paid the contractor because no debt is due. Nor can they proceed directly against the owner if he has not paid the contractor since there is no privity of contract. Direct lien
statutes provide statutory leverage for enforcing payment of
debts by property owners and general contractors by putting the owner on notice that his title will be clouded by a
mechanics' lien if either he or his contractor fails to pay for
supplies and labor used in improving his property.
Risk of loss is allocated to the owner on the theory that
having received the benefit of the goods or services in question, he should not be allowed to profit at the expense of
laborers and materialmen who, in a highly competitive
market, may be unable to protect themselves financially. 6
The owner is presumed to occupy a stronger bargaining position from which he can secure payment to subcontractors by
the contractor. For example, when the owner selects a contractor, he may inquire into the contractor's financial standing. If the contractor's credit is questionable, the owner
may either choose another contractor or require the contractor to put up a security bond to indemnify the owner against
claims of laborers or materialmen. Moreover, the owner can
withhold payment to the original contractor pending
assurance that all claims arising out of contracts with the
contractor have been satisfied by demanding lien waivers
from subcontractors before making payment to the contractor.8 7 Similarly, the owner can make all checks payable jointly to the contractor and potential lien creditors.3 8 The laborer
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Brown and Winckler, The ConstructionDebt Act-A CriticalRejoinder,56 MIcH. S.
B. J. 768, 770 (1977).
Id.
26 Mo. L. REV. supra note 27.
Western Sash & Door Co. v. Buckner, supra note 21, at 101.
Wheelers took the precaution of making its check payable jointly to American
Buildings Company and AASCO, an independent dealer in an earlier transaction,
when AASCO was not an authorized dealer for American. Brief for Appellant at 4.
American Buildings Company v. Wheelers Stores, 585 P.2d 845 (Wyo. 1978).
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or materialman, on the other hand, has only the choice of accepting a subcontract, thereby gambling on a contractor's
likelihood of paying him, or refusing it, and thereby risking
what might have been a lucrative business venture.39
Determining Who May Assert a Lien
Because mechanics' lien preference's extend only to
specific classes of creditors, the question of who comprises40
those classes has been the subject of frequent litigation.
Section 29-2-102 of the Wyoming Statutes gives lien priority
to any person who furnishes either labor or materials for any
building by virtue of a contract with the property owner or
with the owner's contractor. 41 When a lien claimant has contracted to supply labor or materials with someone other than
the property owner or his agent, the critical issue in determining the lien claimant's rights is whether he has contracted with someone who is the "owner's contractor" under
Section 29-2-102.
THE COURT'S REASONING IN

WHEELERS

In Wheelers, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that
only those materialmen who had contracted directly with the
property owner or with the owner's contractor could properly assert a materialman's lien in Wyoming. 4' The absence of
a contract between American and Wheelers, therefore, precluded American from asserting a lien unless Industrial,
with whom American did have a contract, was a contractor
for Wheelers. Thus, American's lien rights turned on the
question of whether the court's definition of "contractor" included parties who had contracted with the property owner
only to supply materials to be used in erecting the building.43
39.

56 MicH. S. B. J., supra note 35.

40.

See generally, Annot., 141 A.L.R. 321 (1942).

41.

WYo. STAT. § 29-2-102 (1977) provides in part that every person who does or performs any work or labor or furnishes any material for any buildig, erection or im-

provement upon land by virtue of any contract with the owner or his or her agent,

42.
43.

trustee, contractor or subcontractor shall have a lien for his work or labor done or
materials furnished on the building, erection or improvements and upon the land
belonging to the owner.
American Buildings Company v. Wheelers Stores, supra note 1.
In denying American standing to assert a lien, the court addressed two issues: first,
whether Industrial was a contractor under § 29-2-102, and second, whether American could assert a lien under the statute if Industrial were not a contractor. Given
the court's holding, however, the first issue is clearly pivotal to the second. Having
determined that Industrial, as a materialman, was not a contractor for purposes of
the statute, it would have been difficult for the court to have allowed American to
assert a lien on another basis.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss2/13
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In deciding this issue, the court could have focused on
the nature of the relationship created by the purchase contract between Industrial and Wheelers. Since Industrial had
contracted with Wheelers to supply the prefabricated building, its relationship to Wheelers was, strictly speaking, that
of a "contractor" to supply goods and not labor and
materials." Had the court approached the question in this

way, its conclusion would have fallen in line with clear
Wyoming and Missouri precedent on the status of materialmen as contractors and subcontractors under mechanics'
lien laws. 5
The court, however, declined to take this approach and
instead focused on Industrial's business function within the
context of the construction industry. According to the court,
when a contract involves construction or improvements on
real property, the term "contractor" has a specialized, narrower meaning than that of "one who contracts with another
to supply goods or services.""6 Applying the principle that
statutory terms must be construed in the context of the subject matter to which they refer,"' the court defined "contractor" as one who not only furnishes materials, but also installs them on the construction project. If his contract requires him to supply only the materials, he is merely a
materialman and not a contractor within the meaning of Section 29-2-102."1 Therefore, the purchase contract did not
make Industrial a contractor under the statute.
44.
45.

46.
47.
48.

BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968).
The Wyoming mechanics' lien statute was adopted in 1877 and modeled on a similar
statute in Missouri. Therefore, Missouri authority, while not binding on Wyoming
courts, is persuasive. Arch Sellery, Inc. v. Simpson, 346 P.2d 1068, 1070, n. 4 (Wyo.
1959), aff'd on rehearing 360 P.2d 911 (Wyo. 1961). Four years before the Wyoming
statute was adopted, a Missouri court ruled that a materialman may be an original
contractor if he furnishes material on a contract with the owner. Hearne v. Railway,
53 Mo. 324 (1873). That rule has been consistently followed in Missouri. Ambrose
Manufacturing Company v. Gapen, 22 Mo. App. 397 (1886), Western Sash and Door
Co. v. Buckner, supra note 21, and E. C. Robinson Lumber Company v. Baugher,
258 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1953). The question of whether a supplier of materials is a contractor or a materialman comes up frequently in the context of notice provisions of
mechanics liens statutes which ordinarily accord longer periods in which to file
notice of a lien to original contractors than to persons claiming liens based on contracts with the contractor. The Wyoming Supreme Court relied on the Missouri rule
in deciding that a materialman was an original contractor who could take advantage
of the longer notice period under the Wyoming statute in Jordan v. Natrona Lumber
Company, 52 Wyo. 393, 75 P.2d 378, 385 (1938). The court in Wheelers distinguished
Jordan on the basis of another issue, but did not confront the Jordan court's holding
on the issue of whether the supplier was an original contractor by virtue of his contract to supply materials.
American Buildings Company v. Wheelers Stores, supra note 1, at 847.
Id
Id
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Having concluded that Industrial was not a contractor,
the court turned to the issue of whether a materialman supplying another materialman was protected under the Wyoming statute. The court decided this question in the
negative.' 9 American, as the supplier of a building to Industrial, could not assert a lien for that building against
Wheelers, either as a subcontractor or as a materialman of
another materialman. According to the court, American's
relationship to Wheelers was too remote to justify its lien
claim.
ANALYSIS

The court's holding in Wheelers reflects its concern with
protecting property owners against claims of materialmen
with whom they have no direct contractual relationship. 0 To
obtain this result, the court conformed its interpretation of
the Wyoming statute to a general rule of some jurisdictions.51 This rule permits suppliers of materials to persons
who have contracted to furnish labor on construction contracts to assert materialmen's liens, but denies those rights
to persons supplying materialmen, without regard to any
agreement between the property owner and the materialman. 52 An evaluation of the court's holding in Wheelers
49.
50.

Id at 848-849.
The court expressed concern that an opposite holding would permit remote suppliers in a materialman's chain to assert liens against property, and a motivating
factor in its decision was defining a cut-off point in a chain of supply to prevent this.
American Buildings Company v. Wheelers Stores, supra note 1, at 850. Since
ustification for statutes providing direct liens weakens as the property owner's
bargaining position weakens the farther one goes down on a materialman's chain,
this concern is merited. However, that concern should not distract one from the purpose of mechanics' lien statutes, which is to provide protection for construction
creditors.
51. See, Annot., 141 A.L.R. 321 (1942); 53 Am. Jua. 2d Mechanics' Liens §§ 71-7311970).
52. The difficulty the court had in applying this rule to the Wyoming statute is
underscored by its inability to cite authority applicable to statutes similar to Section 29-2-102. Although the court cited substantial authority for arriving at this
rule, American Building Company v. Wheelers Stores, supra note I, at 847, n.4, an
analysis of those cases against the statutes they were interpreting indicates that in
every instance those courts were interpreting statutes which differ materially from
the Wyoming statutes in terms of who is entitled to assert a mechanics' lien. See,
e.g., Leonard B. Hebert, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Kinler 336 So.2d 922 (La. App. 1976), construing LA. REV. STAT. 9:4801 (1968) and Drake Lumber Co. v. Lindquist, 179 Ore.
402, 170 P.2d 712 (1946), construing 1944 ORE. LAWS § 67-101. Under both the Louisiana and Oregon statutes, suppliers are cut off by statutory language which defines
contractors and subcontractors as persons authorized by the owner to perform work
on a construction project or otherwise having charge of the construction. Interestingly, the Wyoming court cited Stewart v. Cunningham, 219 Kan. 374 548
P2d 740 (1976) to support its conclusion. However, that case, construing KAN STAT.
§§ 60-1102, a statute with language similar to that of the Wyoming and Missouri
statutes, held that a materialman was a contractor if he furnished materials on a
contract for the improvement of property whether or not he also installed the
materials. See also note 45, supra.
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against the language of the Wyoming statute suggests that
the court's concern with property interests of owners may
have led it to exclude an entire class of construction
creditors who should be protected under Section 29-2-102.
ContractingCapacity Under Section 29-2-102
The Wyoming Statute authorizes five kinds of people to
make contracts on which lien claims may be based: the property owner, his agents and trustees, and his contractors and
subcontractors." Nothing in the statute indicates whether
the terms "contractor" and "subcontractor" were intended
to exclude "materialmen". The court in Wheelers found support for its determination of this issue in the fact that the
word "materialmen" is not included in the list of possible
"contract-makers" under the statute. 4 However, an opposite conclusion can also be inferred from the omission.
After all, if the term "contractor" were intended to cover
materialmen as well as persons performing services, it would
have been redundant to refer to materialmen separately.
This second argument can be further bolstered by an
analysis of the section in terms of contracting capacity. The
five kinds of people authorized to make contracts giving rise
to liens55 are divided into two classes on the basis of their
capacity to make contracts. The first class consists of the
property owner, his agents and trustees, who may contract
directly with materialmen and laborers for improvements on
his real property. The second class includes contractors and
subcontractors. Members of this class contract with the
property owner to supply either labor or materials, of both,
for the improvement. Contractors and subcontractors therefore would seem to be either materialmen or laborers. By virtue of their original direct contracts with the property owner, they may make subcontracts with third parties to furnish
the supplies and labor which they are unable to provide
themselves. The statute entitles both original contractors
and third party suppliers to assert a lien. Since the statute
53.

54.

55.

§ 29-2-102 (1977).
The term "contract-makers" is used here to describe persons authorized by the
statute to make contracts in order to avoid confusion at this point with the words
"contractors" and "subcontractors". The difficulty of finding appropriate synonyms for "contractor" to indicate persons who make contracts illustrates some of
the ambiguity raised by the court's definition.
See text accompanying note 52, supra.
WYO.STAT.
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treats liens arising from claims of materialmen and laborers
on direct contracts equally, giving no preference to one over
the other, 6 it is arguable that contracts made by materialmen and laborers with third party suppliers should also be
treated equally under Section 29-2-102. Unlike the court, the
statute appears to emphasize the contractual relationships
between the various parties and not their business functions.
Applying Wheelers to PrefabricatedBuildings Cases
The Wyoming rule seems to be particularly unresponsive to a new and growing faction of the construction industry, namely suppliers of prefabricated buildings. In
manufacturing prefabricated buildings, much of the construction which would normally take place at the job-site is
performed at the manufacturer's plant. In the Wheelers
situation, American had completely constructed the building
to be used at Wheelers' store site before it ever reached Torrington, Wyoming. All that was required to finish it at the
site was its assembly on delivery. From a practical standpoint, then, in spite of the court's reluctance to accord
American the status of more than materialman, there is little
difference between the labor furnished in producing the prefabricated store building at American's plant and that which
would have been expended in putting up a traditional
building at the store site. Had American done the latter, the
court would have had little difficulty in finding that American was itself a contractor or subcontractor. Similarly, a
finished prefabricated building ought to constitute more
than simply "materials furnished for a building" because it
is in fact the building. In summary, the court failed to
evaluate the relationship of American to the actual construction process of the prefabricated buildings it manufactured.
The court also ignored the reversal of roles of "contractor" and materialman in prefabricated buildings cases. In
an ordinary construction project, the property owner approaches a contractor, whom he asks to furnish or obtain the
materials and labor necessary for the project. Ignoring the
initial meeting between Wheelers and American, in the instant case, Wheelers approached Industrial for the purpose
56.

See, e.g., WYO.

STAT.

§ 29-2-106 (1977).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss2/13
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of buying a building. Industrial, which had no part in either
the manufacturing or construction process, obtained the
building from American, who had provided all the labor and
materials. While it seems clear that American was something more than a mere materialman in the transaction, the
court imputed Industrial's status of materialman to
American in an effort to deal with the anomalous situation of
a construction "subcontractor" 57 supplying a materialman.
Given the holding in Wheelers, it will be extremely difficult
for manufacturers of prefabricated buildings to enforce lien
claims under Section 29-2-102.
Other courts faced with the problem of balancing the interests of property owners against those of materialmen and
subcontractors have been less willing to formulate a rigid
test such as that promulgated in Wheelers. Instead, these
courts have preferred to evaluate a claimant's rights in
terms of the relations and dealings of the parties whose interests are involved."'
In Tiffany Construction Company v. Hancock & Kelley
Construction Company,59 materialmen brought suit against
the prime contractor and its bonding company for payment
on certain claims arising out of a construction contract.
Under the terms of the bond, the prime contractor had
bound itself to pay only materialmen who had supplied
materials to it or its subcontractors. However, the prime
contractor did not bind itself to pay suppliers of materialmen. In determining whether the contractor's supplier was
a materialman or a subcontractor, the court considered the
following factors:
1. Does the custom in the trade consider the supplier a
subcontractor or a materialman?
2. Are the items supplied generally available in an open
market or are they customized?
3. In determining whether the material is customized,
do the plans and specifications call for a unique product or
57. Here "subcontractor" is used in the sense of the court's definition.
58. E.g., Permian Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 68 (10 Cir. 1974).
59. 24 ARiZ. App. 504, 539 P.2d 978 (1975).
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are these specifications merely descriptive of what is to be
furnished?
4. Does the supplier's performance constitute a substantial and definite delegation of a portion of the performance of the prime contract?
These factors seem to be equally applicable to the question of distinguishing between materialmen and contractors.
Adding two more considerations to an evaluation of the
status of materialman or contractor might also prove useful.
5. Were the materials supplied to the contracting
materialman in contemplation of a contract between the
property owner and himself, or were they60intended to be supplied as a part of his regular inventory?

6. Did the property owner stipulate a specific source for
his materials when he contracted with the middleman to obtain them?
Had the court applied these factors in Wheelers, it
might have concluded that the initial meeting between
Wheelers and American to set up the procedure of sale and
purchase of the buildings, the course of dealing between
American and Wheelers through several different contractors, and the modifications of the prefabricated building
made at Wheelers' request, constitute a more direct and
substantial relationship than is superficially apparent. Although the court was concerned with the lack of direct contractual relationship between Wheelers and American, it
should be noted that the purpose of Section 29-2-102 is to
create a lien on property in the absence of a direct contract
between a lien claimant and the property owner. The critical
relationship under the statute is not created by the contract
but instead by the use of the materials supplied to the
owner's property. At the same time, applying this formula
60.

This would avoid the problem encountered in Caulfield v. Polk, 17 Ind. App. 429, 46
N.E. 932 (1897), cited in American Buildings Com pany v. Wheelers Stores, supra
note 1 at 848 (advance sheets). In that case a boiler was furnished to a machine
works which was subsequently sold to the defendant. When the machine works
defaulted on its payment for the boiler, the manufacturer sought a lien against the
defendant. However, the lien was denied because when the boiler was sold to the
machine works, it was intended to be a part of the general inventory of the machine
works and was not supplied in contemplation of any contract with the defendant. In
fact, the sale to the defendant arose some time after the boiler was sold to the
machine works.
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effectively protect property owners from claims of
suppliers in a materialman's chain whose contributhe final product constitutes only an insubstantial
the product.
CONCLUSION

In Wheelers, the court's preoccupation with protecting
property owners from remote lien claimants led it to assert
with black letter finality a rule which denies the lien claims
of suppliers of materialmen without regard to the nature of
the relationships involved. The controlling factor in the
court's analysis of a valid lien claim by materialman was the
business function of the contracting materialman. If he only
supplies materials to a project, but does not perform work,
all suppliers of materials and possibly of labor claiming liens
through him are cut off. The court's ruling circumvents the
purpose of the Wyoming mechanics' lien statute by excluding an entire class of construction creditors whose protection is contemplated by the statute. The holding also fails
to respond to the changes brought about in the construction
industry by the introduction of prefabricated buildings.
A better approach might have evaluated the actual relationships of the parties involved against the circumstances
of their contracts and other dealings with each other. While
this approach could have allayed the anxieties of the court
and property owners concerning remote claims, it also would
have avoided the flat implications of the court's holding in
Wheelers.
MARY ELIZABETH GALVAN
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